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Symposium on Spyware:  The Latest Cyber-Regulatory Challenge 
 
Contracting Spyware by Contract1 
20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1345 (2005) 
Jane K. Winn 
 
Abstract 
 
The question of what constitutes “spyware” is controversial because many programs 
that are “adware” in the eyes of their distributors may be perceived as “spyware” in the 
eyes of the end user.  Many of these programs are loaded on the computers of end users 
after the end user has agreed to the terms of a license presented in a click-through 
interface.  This paper analyzes whether it might be possible to reduce the volume of 
unwanted software loaded on end users’ computers by applying contract law doctrine 
more strictly.  Unwanted programs are often bundled with programs that the end user 
wants, but the disclosure that additional programs will be downloaded is usually buried 
deeply within dense form contracts.  Even though this makes it difficult for end users to 
recognize that they are agreeing to have multiple programs installed at once and that 
some of those programs may be objectionable, US courts are unlikely to invalidate 
those disclosures.  This is because in business to consumer online contracting cases in 
the US, courts have tended to be very deferential to the intentions of the merchants in 
designing the contract interfaces.  In the EU, by contrast, such conduct by software 
distributors would not be binding on consumers.  Under unfair contract terms laws in 
place in EU member states, consumer objections to bundled software could not be 
overridden by terms hidden in standard form contracts.   
 
1.  Introduction:  From Goodware to Badware2 to Somewhere In Between 
 
 Does contract law provide consumers whose computers are clogged with spyware any 
tools to defend themselves against this onslaught of unwanted software?  The answer is likely to 
be no, as courts have shown themselves generally willing to enforce online contracts 
notwithstanding questions about what consumers actually knew or intended when the contract 
was formed.  Although at one extreme it is easy to identify “badware” – viruses, Trojan horses 
and other clearly malicious programs – and at the other, it is equally easy to identify “goodware” 
– popular shareware or freeware applications – there is considerable uncertainty about what end 
users really think about many programs.  Furthermore, software that some commentators label 
pernicious “spyware” is considered to be comparatively benign “adware” by others, making it 
hard to be certain what an individual consumer would think of the program in question and 
whether the consumer would agree to contract for it.3 
                                                 
1.  Professor & Director, Shidler Center for Law, Commerce & Technology, University of Washington School of 
Law at http://www.law.washington.edu/Faculty/Winn/.  Many thanks to my research assistant Andrew Braff for all 
his help. 
2.  Thanks to my colleague Bill Covington for suggesting these terms to characterize the two ends of the spectrum of 
applications that have been labeled spyware. 
3.  Weatherbug is perceived by some to be a legitimate piece of software and adware/spyware by others.  Compare 
PC Hell: How to Remove Weatherbug at http://www.pchell.com/support/weatherbug.shtml (Aug. 17, 2005) with 
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In evaluating online contracts, courts generally have shown more deference to the intent 
of the merchants who design the contract interfaces than to the expectations of consumers using 
them.  In the event any consumers claim software was loaded on their computers without 
authorization, that deference toward the intent of the online interface designer is likely to protect 
distributors of programs that deliver “targeted marketing”4 to consumers using a click-through 
contract interface. 
 In order for contract law to provide a meaningful constraint on the distribution of 
spyware programs, a major revision of current contract law would be required.  Legislation 
pending in Congress in 2005 proposes to do just that: require explicit notice and consent from 
end users before spyware can be loaded onto their computers.5  Assuming such a strategy might 
actually have an impact on the volume of spyware distributed,6 it remains unclear whether such a 
piecemeal, ad hoc approach is a sensible approach to contract law reform.  A similar strategy of 
narrowly targeted sector-specific reforms has been used in U.S. information privacy law for the 
last two decades with disastrous results;7 it is not clear that such a strategy would be any more 
successful when applied to contract law.  By contrast, the more general regulatory approach 
taken in the EU Unfair Contract Terms Directive8 could be used both to block the use of 
misleading contract interfaces to legitimate the distribution of spyware and to provide critical 
scrutiny of merchant designed contracting interfaces generally. 
 The label “spyware” has been applied to a wide range of software applications, and it is 
difficult to identify an authoritative definition of spyware which would clarify the scope of the 
problem.9  Because an in-depth analysis of competing definitions of spyware is beyond the scope 
of this paper, this paper will take the following definition from the Federal Trade Commission 
2004 Federal Register Notice: 
 
[Spyware is] software…that aids in gathering information about a person or 
organization without their knowledge and that may send such information to 
another entity without the consumer's consent, or that asserts control over a 
computer without the consumer's knowledge.10 
                                                                                                                                                             
Weatherbug Frequently Asked Questions: Is Weatherbug spyware or adware? at 
http://www.weatherbug.com/aws/support/faq_spyware.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2005). 
4.  “Targeted marketing” consists of making “the right offer to the right customer at the right time.” See Affiliate 
Program Glossary, available at http://affiliatetip.com/affiliate_glossary.php (last visited May 1, 2005). 
5.  “Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act’ or the ‘Spy Act,’ H.R. 29, 109th Cong. (2005). 
6.  This would be in contrast to the CAN SPAM Act, which one year after enactment “clearly has had no 
meaningful impact on the unrelenting flow of spam that continues to clog the Internet and plague inboxes.”  Keith 
Regan, “CAN-SPAM Gets Mixed Report Card for First Year,” MacNewsWorld.com, Jan. 3, 2005, at 
http://www.macnewsworld.com/story/39354.html. 
7.  See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 58 (2003); Will 
Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283,  285 (2003) 
8.  Council Directive 93/13 EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29. 
9.  See, e.g., SpywareGuide, which described over 1,500 programs that met its definition of spyware in May 2005, 
states “There are a lot of differing opinions on what the definitions of Parasiteware Spyware, Adware and Malware 
should be.” See Intro to Spyware at http://www.spywareguide.com/txt_intro.php (last visited May 1, 2005) (listing 
parasiteware, adware. spyware, malware, page hijackers and dialers as various types of software that may be 
covered by the term spyware.); see also, Consumers Union, Press Release: Consumer Reports Investigates How to 
Protect Against Spam, Spyware and Phishing, August 9, 2004 (“Spyware isn’t a single type of software. The term 
covers a diverse range of applications.”) available at 
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_product_safety/001305.html (last visited May 1, 2005). 
10.  Notice Announcing Public Workshop and Requesting Public Comment, 69 Fed. Reg. 8538 (February 24, 2004). 
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Not all distributors of programs covered by this definition of spyware use contracting interfaces 
to help manage their relationship with those consumers whose computers run their software.  
Distributors of software that includes viruses or other malware that permit the software 
developer to commit identity theft or to access the end user’s financial accounts without 
authorization can distribute their programs with interfaces that do not require the cooperation of 
the end user and so have no reason to ask the end user to assent to the download.  The following 
discussion will address only those software distributors that include contracting interfaces in 
their distribution systems.  
 There are many popular “shareware” or “freeware” programs11 that provide unambiguous 
benefits to end users who manifest assent to their end user license agreements by using a click-
through interface.12  Because end users’ understanding of a program’s function and the users’ 
level of interest in granting programs access to their computers is uncertain, many targeted 
marketing or adware programs fall somewhere in between the extremes of universally detested 
and virulent spyware and acclaimed and popular freeware.  While many end users might 
welcome targeted comparison shopping information about products they are actively seeking, 
they also may hate popup ads.  End users might not understand either the specific quid pro quo 
that a particular targeting marketing company is offering (e.g., free access now to desirable 
content in return for exposure to popup ads in the future), or the mechanism by which that quid 
pro quo is enforced (e.g., adware applications loaded on the end user’s computer). 
 This paper focuses only on those ambiguous cases where a merchant has a plausible 
claim that consumers have consented to the collection of personal information in exchange for 
some product or service, but consumers have a plausible claim that there was no consent.  The 
application of contract law to spyware programs in this ambiguous, intermediate position 
between goodware and badware produces uncertain outcomes, in part because the intent of the 
end user in contracting or downloading is uncertain.  The recent trend in contact cases toward 
liberalizing contract formation doctrine, in effect removing obstacles to the greater use of new 
technologies, makes it unlikely that contract law might be used to establish a framework within 
which more explicit consent must be sought before the collection of personal information could 
begin.  While courts may be unwilling to invalidate clickwrap agreements that legitimate the 
distribution of adware programs that many find annoying, such deference has limits.  Thus, there 
is no reason to expect that judicial deference to online contracts will extend so far as to 
legitimate the distribution of clearly malicious programs that support fraudulent or criminal 
activities.     
 
2.  Interpreting Ambiguous Online Contracting Interfaces 
 
 Targeted marketing firms that collect personal information in exchange for providing 
products or services to consumers use contracting interfaces similar to those used by other online 
merchants: click-through interfaces that seek blanket assent to standard form contracts.  What 
                                                 
11.  “Shareware is software that is distributed free on a trial basis with the understanding that the user may need or 
want to pay for it later.”  Whatis.com definition.  “Freeware... is programming that is offered at no cost and is a 
common class of small applications available for downloading and use in most operating systems.”  Whatis.com 
definition. 
12.  See, e.g., the contracting interfaces for the most popular free software downloads listed at 
http://www.download.com/ (last visited May 1, 2005).  
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often distinguishes the online contracting processes used marketing firms such as Claria and 
WhenU is that consumers may not realize that when they click “I agree” in response to what 
appears to be a standard end user license agreement (EULA),13 they are licensing a bundle of 
different applications, and included in that bundle are programs that have been labeled spyware 
by consumer advocates.14  Consumers may intend to download a single application and end up 
instead downloading several programs, including some they do not want, either by inadvertence, 
because the desired application is not available without the extra programs, or because the 
different programs have actually been combined into one.  The problem of inadvertent or 
qualified assent is exacerbated by the fact that many adware programs are difficult to locate and 
remove because they are not listed in the “Add/Remove Programs” function provided by 
Microsoft Windows operating systems.15 
 Before asking whether assent to the terms of adware EULAs should be treated differently 
than assent to other Internet contracts, it may be useful to consider the current state of Internet 
contracting doctrine generally.  Whether assent to an offer to form a contract has been 
manifested is a fact-specific inquiry.  The Restatement provides that manifestation of assent may 
be by written or spoken words or by other acts or by failure to act but the conduct in question 
must be intentional or the actor must have reason to know conduct will be treated as assent by 
other party.  In the absence of such a manifestation of assent, then the contract may be voidable 
for fraud, duress, mistake or any other invalidating cause.16  The manifestation of mutual assent 
to any exchange ordinarily takes the form of an offer or proposal by one party followed by an 
acceptance by the other party or parties;17 however, a manifestation of mutual assent may be 
made even though neither offer nor acceptance can be identified and even though the moment of 
formation cannot be determined.18  The application of these principles that guide the inquiry into 
                                                 
13.  Use of adware distributed by Claria (formerly known as Gator) is governed by an end user license agreement 
accessible at the website for Gain Publishing; see, e.g., Gain Publishing Privacy Statement and End User License 
Agreement 7.0 issued December 2004, available at 
http://www.gainpublishing.com/global/help/app_privacy/app_ps_v70.html (last visited May 1, 2005).  WhenU 
distributes a wide variety of direct marketing programs that are considered spyware by others, including SaveNow, 
WhenUShop, WeatherCast, ClockSynch and PriceBandit.  Copies of the end user license agreement for each 
product can be accessed at http://www.whenu.com/support.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2005); the contract interface 
used is described at http://www.whenu.com/how_whenu_works_dl.html (last visited May 1, 2005). 
14.  See, e.g., Tatiana Serafin, Mr. Manners, FORBES, July 26, 2004, at 133 (“The Federal Trade Commission held 
workshops on spyware in April, knocking companies (read Claria and WhenU) for failing to disclose how their 
software programs glom on to PCs and how they misbehave thereafter.”). 
15.  Id. 
16.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19. 
17.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 states that an offer is defined as the manifestation of willingness to 
enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to the bargain is invited 
and will conclude it. 
18.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 22; accord U.C.C. § 2-204: 
 
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, 
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.  
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the moment 
of its making is undetermined. 
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness 
if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an 
appropriate remedy. 
 
     U.C.C. § 2-204. 
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whether a contract has been formed to standard form contracts raises troubling, unresolved issues 
about the meaningfulness of the assent.19  The Restatement’s provisions addressing the use of 
standard form contracting attempt to balance the pervasive use of forms with the desire to 
preserve some vestige of concern about the character of the assent to the contents of forms.20  
 The apparent conflict between the freedom of choice ideology embedded in contract 
doctrine and the magnitude of the constraints imposed on consumer choice by standard form 
contracts does not appear to be any more acute in the online environment than it has been in 
traditional markets.21  There does not appear to be any clear evidence that consumers are less 
able to deal with click-through contracting interfaces than they were able to deal with traditional 
paper standard form contracts, or that legitimate merchants use click-through interfaces to take 
advantage of consumers any more often than they did with printed form contracts.  Furthermore, 
the question remains whether the presence of a discernable assent should really be the criteria for 
distinguishing between enforceable and unenforceable contracts formed using new contracting 
systems.22 
 While it may be difficult to ascertain whether courts are more or less deferential to 
merchants seeking enforcement of contracts formed with new contracting systems than they were 
toward merchants in traditional markets, it is not difficult to ascertain the overall trend of 
deference to merchant interface design choices in the face of consumer objections.23  Because 
spyware is delivered exclusively in online environments, the debate surrounding the 
enforceability of “shrinkwrap”24 “pay now, terms later”25 contracts is not relevant here.26  The 
                                                 
19.  Contract scholars have recognized for nearly a century that the use of standard form contract is widespread but 
at the same time fails to conform to classical 19th century freedom of contract principles and debated strategies for 
dealing with this contradiction.  See Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L. J. 34 (1917); 
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 
(1943); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-Making Power, 84 HARV. L. 
REV. 529 (1971). 
20.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 provides: 
 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or otherwise manifests 
assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly used to embody terms 
of agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to 
the terms in the writing. 
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly situated, 
without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the writing. 
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do 
so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, that term is not part of the agreement. 
 
     Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211. 
21.  Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 429, 432-34 (2002). 
22.  Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 681 (2004) (arguing that 
it is possible to determine whether a contract should be enforced without reference to intent). 
23.  See, e.g., James J. White, Autistic Contracts, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1693 (2000) (noting the trend with approval); 
Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1805, 1807 (2000) (noting the trend with disapproval). 
24.  See generally Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-friendly Mass Market Licensing For 
Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687 (2004). 
25.  See generally Gillette, supra note 22 (using the term “rolling contracts” to describe “pay now, terms later” 
contracts). 
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best indication of how courts would likely respond to consumer complaints about the 
enforceability of adware EULAs will come from cases addressing the enforceability of 
“clickwrap” and “browsewrap” agreements.  Clickwrap contract interfaces require some explicit 
manifestation of assent by the consumer to form a contract; in most cases, the consumer is asked 
to select between graphical representations of “I accept” and “I decline” by clicking on the 
chosen alternative.27  Browsewrap terms and conditions are usually found behind a hyperlink 
marked something like “Legal” or “Terms” or “Use of this site signifies your acceptance of the 
Terms and Conditions.”  Because end users must seek out browsewrap terms in order to learn 
their contents, there is considerable disagreement over whether browsewrap interfaces can be 
used to form contracts at all.28   However, the mere fact that some courts have been willing to 
entertain the idea that an online contract could be formed without any apparent manifestation of 
assent by the end user is an important development in this area.29 
 The first cases holding explicitly that a click-through interface design could be used to 
form a binding contract appeared in 1998.30  In all, more than a dozen cases have been decided 
upholding the enforceability of contracts formed using click-through interfaces.31  In only a few 
cases have courts refused to enforce specific terms contained within contracts formed using a 
click-through interface, and the terms at issue have been found to violate a public policy of the 
forum state or to be unconscionable.  In one, a court refused to enforce a choice of forum term 
that would have required a Massachusetts resident to file suit in Virginia, which does not 
generally permit class action law suits, because it found that to do so would in effect deprive 
Massachusetts consumers of any right to challenge the merchant’s performance under the 
contract.32  In Comb v. PayPal, Inc., a federal district court refused to enforce an arbitration 
agreement contained in a clickwrap agreement after the merchant presented inadequate evidence 
                                                                                                                                                             
26.  See Gillette, supra note 22 at 685-88 (summarizing the debate); see also Christina L. Kunz, Maureen F. Del 
Duca, Heather Thayer & Jennifer C. Dubrow, Click-Through Agreements:  Strategies for Avoiding Disputes on 
Validity of Assent, 57 BUS. LAW. 401 (2001) (ABA Working Group on Electronic Contracting Practices report). 
27.  Id. 
28.  See Christina L. Kunz, John E. Ottaviani, Elaine D. Ziff, Juliet M. Moringiello, Kathleen M. Porter, & Jennifer 
C. Debrow, Browse-Wrap Agreements:  Validity of Implied Assent in Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 
279 (2003) (ABA Working Group on Electronic Contracting Practices report). 
29.  See generally id. 
30.  The first appears to have been Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie, Inc., 1998 WL 388389, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 
(BNA) (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (preliminary injunction to stop spammer from using Hotmail’s e-mail service 
because no e-mail account could be set up without clicking through online registration agreement prohibiting the 
sending of unsolicited commercial e-mail); a close second seems to have been Groff v. America Online, 1998 WL 
307001 (R.I. Super. 1998) (no authorization to proceed with class action lawsuit when all members of putative class 
would have had to click through online registration agreement with choice of forum clause pointing to a different 
jurisdiction).  
31.  Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); In re RealNetworks, Inc. 
Privacy Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584 (N.D. Ill., 2000); Lieschke v. RealNetworks, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1683 (N.D. Ill., 2000); America Online v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Barnett v. 
Network Solutions, 38 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. App. 2001); Forrest v. Verizon Communs., Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 
2002); Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, (App. Div. 2002); Net2phone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 149 (Ct. App. 2003); DeJohn v. .TV Corp. Int'l, 245 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Davidson & Assocs. 
v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170 (E.D. Mo., 2004); Mortgage Plus, Inc. v. DocMagic, Inc., 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20145 (D. Kan., 2004). 
32  Williams v. America Online, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 11 (February 8, 2001); accord Scarcella v. America 
Online, 798 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Civ. Ct. 2004) (refuses to enforce AOL forum selection clause when alterative is small 
claims court); but see Celmins v. America Online, 748 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999); America Online v. Booker, 
781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001) (enforcing the same term against Florida residents). 
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of what contract terms had actually been displayed to the plaintiffs when they enrolled in the 
service or that those terms had subsequently been validly modified to include an arbitration term 
and the plaintiffs alleged deplorable misconduct on the part of the merchant.33 
  Given the strong trend in recent cases favoring the enforcement of clickwrap agreements 
in the absence of a conflict between a requirement of a term in the contract and a fundamental 
public policy of the forum, or evidence of misconduct so egregious that it might rise to the level 
of unconscionable, courts are likely to find that adware EULAs are enforceable contracts.  Most 
recent clickwrap cases deal with consumer objections to the level of service provided by online 
service providers, and a consumer might try to distinguish a service contract under which a 
consumer gains access to e-mail and the Internet generally from an agreement under which a 
consumer gains access to comparison advertising presented in the form of annoying pop-up ads.  
However, in the absence of any evidence of serious misuse of personally identifiable information 
by the adware company, the distinction is unlikely to be persuasive. 
 One distinction between most clickwrap agreements with online service providers and 
adware companies is that, while consumers may rarely read and understand the terms of the 
online service provider’s form contract before manifesting assent to it, and thus may find quite a 
few of the terms contained in the form surprising, they are likely to have a reasonably accurate 
idea of what the other party to the contract will provide.  In the adware context, consumers may 
not have an accurate idea of what the other party will provide if the adware programs are 
bundled with other programs and the bundling is disclosed only in the form contract.  Many 
consumers know they are downloading at least one program they want, but generally do not 
understand that their access to that program is conditioned on accepting a second program that 
will monitor their online conduct and transmit information about them to a third party so that 
relevant comparison ads can be shown to them in the future.34  In other words, consumers are 
paying for access to the programs or services they want by using their personal information and 
displays of comparison ads as currency. 
Anecdotally, many consumers apparently believe that licenses to online content or access 
to online services are being granted in return for nothing more than a release of liability from the 
consumer to the provider.  Given the popularity of such business models during the dot-com 
bubble, it might be difficult to say that such consumer expectations are unreasonable.  However, 
few cases considering the enforceability of clickwrap agreements consider whether consumer 
claims to be surprised by arbitration agreements or choice of forum clauses that make it 
prohibitively expensive for consumers to sue online merchants are reasonable.  It seems likely, 
therefore, that the need to avoid frustrating reasonable consumer expectations about the online 
environment will lay adequate grounds to refuse enforcement of adware EULAs. 
 Although several courts have held that browsewrap interfaces do not establish 
manifestation of assent to contract terms,35 not all that have considered the issue have so held.36  
                                                 
33.  218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2002).  
34.  Ben Elgin, Guess What -- You Asked For Those Pop-Up Ads, BUSINESS WEEK, June 28, 2004, at 94. 
35.  Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987, 18 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Specht v. Netscape, 306 
F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 2002); In re Northwest Airlines Privacy Litigation 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10580 (D. Minn. 2004).  
36.  Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (refusing summary judgment dismissing 
contract claims); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F.Supp 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that contract was 
formed by posted terms even without click-though interface where evidence showed that defendant had actual 
knowledge of terms); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) 
P28,607 (2003) (reviewing a revised Ticketmaster interface and refusing Tickets.com summary judgment dismissing 
contract claims). 
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While this split in the cases hardly justifies advising a client that embedding the terms of a 
contract behind an obscure hyperlink may result in an enforceable contract, courts’ unwillingness 
to uniformly reject such a suggestion as preposterous demonstrates the depth of the deference 
that courts show to those who develop innovative contracting interfaces with what appears to be 
cavalier disregard for established contract law doctrine.  Closer examination of the cases reveals 
that all three cases holding either that browsewrap might be the basis of a contract – or at least 
that summary judgment against the party advancing that argument would be premature – involve 
business-to-business contracts, not business-to-consumer contracts.  Furthermore, in all three 
cases the party claiming that a browsewrap interface can be used to form a contract also had 
strong claims that the defendant should also be held liable for unfair competition.  If the cases 
holding that browsewrap might be enough to form a contract are in substance disguised unfair 
competition cases, then consumers finding fault with the ambiguity of adware EULA contract 
interfaces should be able to distinguish those cases.  But because adware distributors appear to be 
happy to use click-through interfaces, this distinction is unlikely to help many consumers who 
object to the adware on their computers.  
 
3.  Liability under Other Forms of Online Market Regulation 
 
 Because it seems unlikely that contract law will provide much protection to consumers 
from unwanted adware, the possibility that other doctrines that regulate market conduct could 
provide a shield should be explored.  However, a review of unfair competition, deceptive trade 
practices, electronic surveillance, and computer fraud laws provides little more hope for 
disgruntled consumers than contract law does. 
 Both federal and state unfair competition laws provide competitors a cause of action to 
object to improper conduct by merchants on behalf of consumers rather than providing 
consumers with a direct cause of action.  Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act created a federal law 
of unfair competition; in 1988 its scope was expanded by the Trademark Law Revision Act, 
which codified more than two decades of case law.  Section 43(a) prohibits the use in 
commercial advertising of any word, term, name, symbol or device or false or misleading 
statement of fact that misrepresents the nature, characteristics or quality of goods, services or 
commercial activities.37  Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition Law 
provides that “one who, in connection with marketing of goods or services, makes a 
representation relating to the actor’s own goods, services, or commercial activities that is likely 
to deceive or mislead prospective purchasers to the likely commercial detriment of another” may 
be liable to the other.  As with § 43(a), the appropriate remedy in the absence of a showing of 
specific harm to a competitor is injunctive relief.38  Companies whose customers are shown 
comparison ads by means of adware may well have an unfair competition claim against the 
adware company or its customer whose comparison ad is displayed, but consumers would not be 
able to bring suit in their own names if no competitor was willing to act. 
 Because spyware involves the transmission of personal information without the 
knowledge or consent of the person whose information is being sent, and because federal 
deceptive trade practices law has been the foundation of Federal Trade Commission efforts to 
                                                 
37.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
38.  Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition Law § 35. 
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increase the level of protection given to personal information,39 federal deceptive trade practices 
law actions seem like a promising strategy to help consumers fight back against unwanted 
adware programs.  By 2005, however, the FTC had announced only one spyware enforcement 
action.40  Because many states have enacted “Little FTC Acts” with provisions similar to Section 
5 of the FTC Act that are enforced by state attorneys general or that grant a private cause of 
action to consumers, consumers may have better luck fighting spyware with state deceptive trade 
practices law than with federal. 
 In 1968, Congress enacted the Wiretap Act to establish a framework within which police 
would be permitted monitor telephone communications.  In 1986, Congress revised the statute to 
include electronic communications,41 which is now known as the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA).42  The second title of the ECPA also added an entirely new regulatory 
program, the Stored Communications Act, which covers access to certain stored 
communications.43  The ECPA applies not only to government monitoring of electronic 
communications, but also to monitoring by private parties.  The ECPA generally prohibits 
anyone other than the sender and intended recipient of a message from intercepting it in transit, 
accessing it after it has been stored, or disclosing its contents.  The ECPA restricts the ability of 
both government agents and private parties to monitor electronic communications.  
 An important exception to the application of the ECPA exists where one of the parties to 
the communication has consented to the monitoring.44 The scope of this exception for monitoring 
consented to by one of the parties to an electronic communication has recently been the subject 
of considerable controversy in the context of Internet commerce. If a website operator monitors 
the activities of visitors to its site and also posts a privacy policy explaining the scope of the 
personal information it collects and the uses to which it puts that information, then even though 
the visitor may not have expressly consented to the collection of the information, the visitor has 
been provided with notice. Many website operators permit third parties to post banner ads on 
their sites, and many of the providers of banner ads also monitor the conduct of visitors to the 
website hosting the ad and collect personal information about those visitors, which is later 
analyzed to permit more accurate targeting of advertisements. If the providers of banner ads 
place “cookies” on the hard drives of visitors to websites hosting the ads, the visitors may be 
unaware of the fact that someone other than the operator of the website is monitoring their online 
activity and furthermore may not know how to discover the identity of the banner ad provider or 
learn its privacy policies. 
 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)45 addresses unauthorized access and misuse 
of computers and computer networks.  The CFAA prohibits various forms of unauthorized 
                                                 
39.  Section 5 of the FTC Act provides “Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are hereby declared unlawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).  
Since the late 1990s, the FTC has been encouraging online businesses to disclose their privacy practices and taking 
enforcement actions based on its deceptive trade practices authority against online businesses that fail to do what 
their privacy policies say.  See FTC descriptions of all the enforcement actions it has taken against online businesses 
for failing to follow their posted privacy policies, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/promises_enf.html (last viewed Aug. 18, 2005).   
40.  FTC v. Seismic Entm't Prods., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22788 (D.N.H., 2004); FTC Press Release, October 12, 
2004, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/10/spyware.htm (last viewed May 1, 2005). 
41.  Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). 
42.  Codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2005). 
43.  Codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2005). 
44.  18 USC § 2511(3)(b) 
45.  18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
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access of “protected computers.”  In 1996, the definition of “protected computer” was 
considerably expanded: now any unauthorized interference with a computer with access to the 
Internet may be a federal crime.46  The CFAA prohibits unauthorized access or exceeding 
authorized access to obtain information from a protected computer,47 accessing a protected 
computer with intent to defraud or obtain anything of value,48 or intentionally harming a 
protected computer.49 
 An in depth exploration of the application of these statutes to spyware generally is 
provided in “Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance” by Patricia Bellia.50  Some recent attempts 
to use these statutes as the basis for class action lawsuits based on allegations of online privacy 
violations indicate that their application to unwanted adware in particular may not prove to be 
very helpful.51 
 If the consumer could claim that unwanted adware running on a computer substantially 
interfered with the consumer’s use of that computer, then it might be possible to make out a 
trespass to chattels claim.52  Once again, while there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the 
scope of such a claim in light of conflicting case law, the trend in recent cases has been for courts 
to be more skeptical of such claims and to ask computer owners to tolerate more unwanted 
interference with the use of computers connected to the Internet.53 
 
4.  Regulatory Alternatives to Contract Doctrine 
 
 Because none of the obvious alternatives to liability for breach of contract seem any more 
likely to give consumers an effective legal remedy against the unwanted distribution of adware, 
many law reform proposals have been offered.   Given that “unfair competition” is the body of 
law that addresses overzealous competition among merchants, perhaps what is needed is a new 
doctrine of “unfair marketing” that protects online consumers against overzealous marketing by 
online merchants.  A claim of unfair marketing of adware might be defended by a showing that 
the adware company had clearly and explicitly disclosed to the consumer what the consumer 
would be giving up in exchange for whatever product or service the consumer intended to accept.  
In fact, that was more or less the approach taken in Congress in 2005 when H.R. 29, the Securely 
Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, or “Spy Act,” was introduced.54 
                                                 
46.  18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2). 
47.  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). 
48.  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). 
49.  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5). 
50 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1283 (2005). 
51.  In re Doubleclick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 519-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 
F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1279-81 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
52.  Trespass to chattels is defined as the unauthorized, intentional, and substantial use of or intermeddling with 
another’s tangible personal property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217–218 (1965). 
53.  Trespass was found in Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559 (1996);  
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 
100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F.Supp 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); EF 
Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2003).  No trespass was found in Ticketmaster Corp. v. 
Tickets.com, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P28,607 (2003); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 
1342 (2003); Southwest Airlines Co. v. FareChase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435 (N.D. Tex. 2004); Nautical Solutions 
Mktg. v. Boats.com, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6304 (M.D. Fla. 2004).  
54.  The 109th Congress Spy Act is similar to the 108th Spy Act that passed overwhelmingly in the House but 
stalled in the Senate. 
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 The Spy Act’s “notice and consent” approach55 to dealing with unwanted adware appears 
to be drawn more from tort law than from contract law, which is consistent with an unfair 
competition approach.  As a narrowly targeted response to the problem of unwanted adware, the 
Spy Act may well have a material impact on the business models and software designs of 
legitimate adware distributors.56  If the Spy Act is characterized as a narrowly targeted reform of 
contract law, however, its likely impact will be much less positive.  U.S. information privacy law 
is now in shambles after decades of narrowly focused, piecemeal legislation; the notice and 
consent approach taken in various information privacy statutes has achieved only modest 
success.57  Perhaps narrowly focused, piecemeal legislation to reform contract law is better than 
nothing it if can help stem the rising tide of spyware being loaded on consumers, but it is no 
substitute for a more general reappraisal of the current state of contract law as it applies to online 
transactions. 
 In contrast, the EU Directive on Unfair Contract Terms was promulgated in 1993 and 
provides a very successful example of a reorientation of contract law following such a general 
reappraisal.58  Member States were expected to pass laws implementing its provisions by the end 
of 1994.  The Directive provides that contract terms not individually negotiated will be deemed 
unfair if they create a significant imbalance, to the consumer’s detriment, between the rights and 
obligations of the contracting parties.59  If a contract term is drafted in advance and the consumer 
has no influence over the substance of the term, then it is always considered not to be 
individually negotiated, and hence subject to review based on substantive fairness.60  An annex 
to the directive contains an expansive list of terms that may be deemed unfair.61  The nature of 
                                                 
55.  Spy Act section 3 provides that it is unlawful to transmit an adware program to a computer or execute adware 
software on a computer unless the consumer is provided with a clear, explicit notice that personal information will 
be collected and provided an opportunity to consent to that function; the end user can easily identify the adware 
program and remove it, and when advertisements are displayed, the adware company is identified as the source of 
the ad. 
56.  By contrast, distributors of nefarious or fraudulent spyware are unlikely to be any more deterred by the Spy Act 
than distributors of fraudulent spam e-mails have been deterred by the CAN SPAM Act. 
57.  See Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 826-28 (2000) (discussing the 
shortcomings of the informed consent model of information privacy protection). 
58.  Council Directive 93/13 EEC, supra note 8; see generally, James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in 
the Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 109 (2003). 
59.  Council Directive 93/13 EEC, supra note 8 at art. 3. 
60.  Id. at art. 2. 
61.  The terms listed in the annex include: 
(a) excluding or limiting the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the event of the death of a 
consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from an act or omission of that seller or 
supplier;  
(b) inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis the seller or 
supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or inadequate 
performance by the seller or supplier of any of the contractual obligations, including the option of 
offsetting a debt owed to the seller or supplier against any claim which the consumer may have 
against him;  
(c) making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of services by the seller or 
supplier is subject to a condition whose realization depends on his own will alone;  
(d) permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where the latter decides 
not to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for the consumer to receive 
compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller or supplier where the latter is the party 
cancelling the contract;  
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the goods or services covered by the contract, the circumstances surrounding the drawing up of 
the contract, and the other terms in the contract or in another contract to which it relates will be 
taken into account in assessing the unfairness of a term.62  Contract terms offered to consumers 
in writing must always be drafted in plain language and where there is doubt as to the meaning of 
a term, the interpretation most favorable to the consumer will prevail.63  In the event that terms in 
a consumer contract are found to be unfair, those terms will not be binding on consumers, 
although the remainder of the contract will be enforceable.64 
Adware clickwrap agreements would likely be unenforceable under the law of EU 
member states on the grounds that consumers are normally required to agree to the contract 
terms before having any real opportunity to become acquainted with them.  However, the list of 
unfair terms in the Annex to the Directive are merely suggestive and not in any way limiting.  As 
a result, a court in an EU member state might find that contract terms are unfair and thus 
                                                                                                                                                             
(e) requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a disproportionately high sum 
in compensation;  
(f ) authorizing the seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary basis where the 
same facility is not granted to the consumer, or permitting the seller or supplier to retain the sums 
paid for services not yet supplied by him where it is the seller or supplier himself who dissolves 
the contract;  
(g) enabling the seller or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate duration without 
reasonable notice except where there are serious grounds for doing so;  
(h) automatically extending a contract of fixed duration where the consumer does not indicate 
otherwise, when the deadline fixed for the consumer to express this desire not to extend the 
contract is unreasonably early;  
(i) irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of becoming 
acquainted before the conclusion of the contract;  
( j) enabling the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without a valid 
reason which is specified in the contract;  
(k) enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid reason any characteristics of 
the product or service to be provided;  
(l) providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery or allowing a seller of 
goods or supplier of services to increase their price without in both cases giving the consumer the 
corresponding right to cancel the contract if the final price is too high in relation to the price 
agreed when the contract was concluded;  
(m) giving the seller or supplier the right to determine whether the goods or services supplied are 
in conformity with the contract, or giving him the exclusive right to interpret any term of the 
contract;  
(n) limiting the seller’s or supplier’s obligation to respect commitments undertaken by his agents 
or making his commitments subject to compliance with a particular formality;  
(o) obliging the consumer to fulfill all his obligations where the seller or supplier does not perform 
his;  
(p) giving the seller or supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and obligations under the 
contract, where this may serve to reduce the guarantees for the consumer, without the latter’s 
agreement;  
(q) excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any other legal 
remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not 
covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a 
burden of proof which, according to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the 
contract. 
     Unfair Contract Terms Directive Annex. 
62.  Council Directive 93/13 EEC, supra note 8 at art. 4. 
63.  Id. at art. 5. 
64.  Id. at art. 6. 
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unenforceable if they purport to permit a software distributor to load several software programs 
at once without clearly disclosing that more than one program is being loaded, or to load an 
adware program on a computer without clearly explaining its functions. 
 The Unfair Contract Terms Directive takes the opposite approach of current U.S. contract 
law: instead of a presumption of deference to whatever novel contract interface the merchant has 
developed, the Directive substitutes a presumption that the merchant will be bound to a contract 
based on the reasonable expectations of the consumer.  Under such a standard for contract 
formation, it would be easy to predict that objectionable adware products would not be protected 
by click-through contract interfaces.  Furthermore, even adware distributors that clearly and 
explicitly disclosed their business models – which is all that proposed U.S. legislation such as the 
Spy Act would require – might find that some elements of those business models would not be 
permitted notwithstanding the full disclosure if the behavior that the contract purports to 
authorize is not actually fair to consumers. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
 Adware distributors believe that consumers want the comparison advertisements they 
provide.  Many others believe that such programs are simply another form of spyware, and that 
consumers would not accept such programs on their computers if adware distributors were 
required to disclose the purpose and functions of the software clearly and explicitly.  If existing 
contract law doctrine regarding the formation of contracts were applied rigorously and 
consistently, then contract law might provide an effective mechanism for determining which 
description of reality is more accurate.  However, whatever rigor and vitality applicable contract 
law doctrine might have possessed has already been dissipated by courts trying to accommodate 
a wide range of innovation in contracting systems.  As a result, courts reviewing the contracting 
interfaces used by adware distributors in light of current law are unlikely to demand that they 
make clear and explicit disclosures before claiming that consumers have consented to running 
their software. 
 Law reform efforts aimed at filling this apparent gap in contract doctrine appear narrowly 
targeted at problems associated with a particular technology – spyware – and so are unlikely to 
have any impact on the balance of power between merchant and consumer under contract law 
doctrine generally.  This piecemeal, sectoral approach to the reform of contract law is 
reminiscent of the U.S. approach to information privacy law, which has proved to be a dismal 
failure.  One alternative to a narrowly targeted, ad hoc approach to controversies in contract law 
triggered by specific technological innovations would be to address the balance of power 
between merchant and consumer more generally, following the approach taken in the EU Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive.  However, the pronounced U.S. proclivity for market-oriented rather 
than regulatory approaches to new commercial practices makes it very unlikely that such an 
approach would be tried in the U.S. 
